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Abstract
Loss Given Default (LGD) models predict losses as a proportion of the outstanding loan, in the event a debtor goes into default.  The literature on corporate sector LGD models suggests LGD is correlated to the economy and so changes in the economy could translate into different predictions of losses.  In this work, the role of macroeconomic variables in loan-level retail LGD models is examined by testing the inclusion of macroeconomic variables in two different retail LGD models: a two-stage model for a residential mortgage loans dataset and an OLS model for an unsecured personal loans dataset.  To improve loan-level predictions of LGD, indicators relating to the macro-economy are considered, with mixed results: the selected macroeconomic variable seemed able to improve the predictive performance of mortgage loan LGD estimates, but not for personal loan LGD.  For mortgage loan LGD, interest rate was most beneficial but only predicted better during downturn periods, underestimating LGD during non-downturn periods.  For personal loan LGD, only net lending growth is statistically significant but including this variable did not bring any improvement to R-square.  
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1. Introduction
One of the risks associated with lending are the losses financial institutions would incur should debtors default on their loans.  In order to absorb some of these losses, banks hold certain levels of capital – the more they hold, the less likely it is that they would encounter insolvency, but it also means that they would make less profit.  How much a financial institution holds not only depends on their risk appetite, as the Basel II and III accords regulate the minimum amount of capital it must have.  In order to comply with the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach set out in the accord, an institution is required to estimate a number of components that make up potential credit losses: Probability of Default (PD), Exposure at Default (EAD) and Loss Given Default (LGD), i.e. the proportion of the outstanding balance that the bank is unable to recover in the event that the borrower defaults on the loan.  The work here pertains to LGD of mortgage loans and personal loans.  

In the research literature, one finds a substantial body of work on estimating PD and LGD (or its complement recovery rate (RR)) for corporate lending.  Models there regularly incorporate macroeconomic variables, finding a definite relationship between the economy, default and LGD (see Schuermann (2004), Frye (2000a, 2000b), Acharya et al. (2003)).  Dermine and Carvalho (2006), working with data from a Portuguese bank, included macroeconomic variables in the development of their recovery model but found them to be insignificant, possibly because there was no economic downturn during the sample period.  From their benchmarking study, Altman et al. (2005) conclude that while no single macroeconomic variable in recovery models is adequate, recovery models do benefit statistically from the inclusion of a variable which represents the macroeconomy.  More recently, Figlewski et al. (2008) undertook an extensive study in which they considered a broad range of macroeconomic variables in the prediction of hazard rates for different credit events.  They found that macroeconomic variables do appear statistically significant at times (in their default intensity models), but that they might also be unstable and unreliable when used for certain models (i.e. most of the risk grade migration models), thus re-emphasizing the complexity of incorporating macroeconomic indicators and the need for more work to be carried out in this area. 

Incorporating macroeconomic indicators into PD and LGD models has so far been less common in the credit risk literature for retail lending, i.e. consumer or small business lending.  This certainly applies to mortgage loan risk models.  Firstly, the work that has been reported on mortgage lending has for a long time focused on PD rather than LGD (see von Furstenberg (1969), Avery et al. (1996), Wong et al. (2004)).  Some acknowledge the volatility of loss, but do so only alongside default models (see Pennington-Cross (2003), Calem and LaCour-Little (2004)).  Secondly, there are relatively few fully developed and validated credit models in the retail sector documented in the academic literature that include macroeconomic variables or that explicitly model the potential correlation between PD and LGD.  Similarly to Jokivuolle and Peura (2003), who studied the connection between the variability of LGD and uncertainty in collateral value in reference to corporate debt, Hui et al. (2006) suggested that mortgage loans too have collateral put up with the loan, whose value changes over time; based on an empirical study on a sample of mortgage loans in Hong Kong, they came to the conclusion that there is indeed a correlation between collateral value and PD.  In addition, they also showed that amongst other variables, Loan to Value (LTV) ratio at the time of loan application and volatility of collateral value should play a part in the assessment of the risk of a retail portfolio.  Finally, where LGD models for other types of retail loans are concerned, Bellotti and Crook (2012) carried out a similar analysis in which they incorporated macroeconomic variables into an LGD model for credit card loans.  They find that macroeconomic variables do play a significant role in reducing the difference between predicted and observed LGD.  However, as their study focused on credit card defaults, more research would be called for to further validate these findings in other retail settings.  Note that almost all of the models mentioned here are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models, which is an indication of the prevalence of OLS models in the literature. This is the typical setting for a financial institution building an LGD model, where only static data is used (for example, see Calem and LaCour-Little (2004), Hui et al. (2006), Qi and Yang (2009)).  Several benchmarking papers including Bellotti and Crook (2009) and Yashkir and Yashkir (2013) have also found that the predictive performance of OLS models are comparable to, if not better than, other models like Tobit regression or decision trees.  

Since there are still several gaps in our understanding of how to model the impact of the economy in retail lending credit models for LGD, what we propose here is to investigate the impact macroeconomic variables would have on the prediction of LGD for two different types of retail loans.  Based on the findings from previous work of ours and the aforementioned benchmarking papers, as well as the fact that we only have static information in the two datasets obtained from a UK lender, we use two different modelling strategies: (1) for the mortgage dataset we start from a two-stage modelling approach that is popular among UK mortgage lenders, which involves logistic regression to model the probability of repossession (foreclosure) and OLS to model the haircut (i.e. the reduction in the property's estimated market value) (as further detailed in Leow and Mues (2012)); (2) for the second dataset, we start by fitting an OLS model to estimate the LGD of a personal loan (previously included in Loterman et al. (2012)).  We will then extend these loan-level models (which we will refer to as the “base models”) to include relevant macroeconomic variables that might further improve the predictions of LGD, thereby investigating the impact of loan-level as well as pool-level performance and the extent to which the resulting models are able to better capture LGD variations over time.  We also look at pool-level calibration and how well predictions hold up on aggregate over time, which are two aspects that many other papers do not consider and are of particular interest to Basel analysts.  The literature highlights the increasing significance of the macro-economy on both PD and LGD models in the corporate sector, so we are inclined to expect similar results for risk models in the retail sector.  

The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 gives some background information on the base models, and Section 3 lists the research objectives.  Section 4 details the macroeconomic variables used and methodology applied on both retail loan datasets; results for each retail loan dataset are provided in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.  Section 7 concludes.

2. Background on base models
Data of two types of retail loans are used here, residential mortgage loans and unsecured personal loans; the observations in both datasets contain loan-level information about individual accounts that have gone into default.  

2.1. Mortgage loan LGD model
The data used in the development of the mortgage loan LGD model is supplied by a major UK bank, with about 120,000 unique accounts from all parts of the UK.  All are defaulted mortgage loans between the years 1990 and 2002, and about 35 percent of the accounts in the dataset undergo repossession.  All are residential mortgages, with no buy-to-let mortgages.  When a mortgage loan goes into default, it is possible for the bank to decide to repossess the security.  If the bank is successful in selling the property, it is usually sold at a price lower than its current market value due to the circumstances of its sale.  This difference is called the haircut and is defined here as the actual (forced) sale price as a ratio of the current market valuation of the property (which is updated from its original sale price via the Halifax House Price Index, quarterly, regional).   So the definition of LGD is the final loss after the repossessed security is sold, as a proportion of the outstanding balance at default, as given in Equation 1.​[1]​
LGD = 		(1)

The distribution of mortgage loan LGD is not normal, but the distribution of haircut is approximately normal (see Leow and Mues (2012)), so the LGD model for this mortgage loan dataset consists of two component models: a Probability of Repossession Model (a logistic regression model which gives the probability of a default loan going into repossession) and a Haircut Model (consisting of two further linear regression sub-models, one which estimates haircut itself, and the other that produces the standard deviation of predicted haircut).  These component models are then combined using the expected shortfall method, according to which LGD is predicted to be the product of the probability of repossession and expected loss as a ratio of outstanding balance and whereby expected loss is derived from an estimated normal haircut distribution having the predicted haircut from the Haircut Model as the mean, and the standard deviation obtained from the Haircut Standard Deviation Model.  During this analysis, we found that combining the following three variables, LTV (i.e. initial Loan To Value), Loan to Value ratio at default (abbreviated: DLTV) and time on books in any single model would cause counter-intuitive parameter estimate signs.  As such, the suitability of incorporating either LTV and time on books, or DLTV, was investigated for each of the component models and one of either options was selected based on which gave the best overall performance measure (ROC for the Probability of Repossession Model; R-square for the Haircut Model).  More details can be found in Leow and Mues (2012).

2.1.1. The Probability of Repossession Model
The variables in the Probability of Repossession Model are DLTV, an indicator for previous default and type of security (detached, semi-detached, terraced, flat, others); in this paper we also included dummy variables to account for quarterly seasonality in repossession rates.  The fact that DLTV is one of the explanatory variables in the base model means that some economic data has already entered the model.  This is because DLTV is the ratio of outstanding balance over an updated valuation of the property, calculated via the House Price Index (HPI) and the original valuation at loan origination (see Equation 2).
 			(2)

2.1.2. The Haircut Model
The Haircut Model is made up of two sub-models: one which predicts the haircut, and the other which estimates the standard deviation of haircut.  The Haircut Standard Deviation Model is left unchanged because of the reasonably high R-square achieved (0.93 for the training set; 0.83 for the test set).  Hence, it would seem that any contribution macroeconomic variables can give to predicted haircut would be in the prediction of haircut itself.  The final variables in this sub-model for haircut are LTV, an indicator for previous default, age band of the property, region, type of security, time on books in months and ratio of current valuation of security to average valuation in the region, binned.  Again, the HPI is to some extent already factored into the model through the calculations for the ratio of current valuation to average property valuation.  

2.2. Personal loan LGD model
This data is supplied by a major UK bank, with about 48,000 unique accounts for unsecured personal loans and about 45 variables describing customer information collected at time of loan application, as well as information collected during the loan term and at default.  Accounts default between the years of 1989 and 1999.  More details about this dataset can be found in Matuszyk et al. (2010).    LGD values were given by the bank and calculated as given in Equation 3.
LGD = 		(3)

A linear regression LGD model for this dataset has already been developed by Loterman et al. (2012), using characteristics of defaulted loans.  Although LGD does not have a normal distribution, they found that the alternative non-OLS regression approaches and target variable transformations (e.g. log transform and other Box-Cox transformations) considered in their study did not improve model performance for a distribution with one or two pronounced point densities; hence our choice for OLS in this paper.  The variables in the resulting LGD model can be roughly divided into two groups: customer-related data, which include the application score, indicator for presence of joint applicant, marital status, length of time at address, employment and residential status of account holder at the start of the loan, as well as information about other loan commitments, i.e. whether they have a mortgage, current, savings or personal account; or loan-related characteristics such as the loan amount, the term and purpose of the loan, the length of time the loan has been at the bank, as well as whether the loan was ever in arrears and the extent of arrears, if any.    

3. Research objectives
Empirically, we have reason to believe that the economy affects mortgage recovery.  In our first dataset, we observe a substantial increase in repossession rate​[2]​ in the mortgage loan portfolio during the economic downturn experienced by the UK in the early 1990s, as seen in Figure 1.  Similarly, in Figure 2, we see that the mean LGD observed for different default years in our second dataset (i.e., containing data about personal loan defaults) also is slightly higher in the period corresponding to the early-nineties economic downturn, compared to the mid-nineties; here the effect seems less pronounced though and LGD appears to be creeping up again in the latter years.   

Figure 1: Observed bank repossession rate and mean LGD for mortgage loan data.  The solid dots represent the mean observed repossession rate and the squares represent the mean observed LGD.  Due to confidentiality issues, the scale of the vertical axis has been omitted.

Despite these indications that loss rates in both datasets may be affected by the economic conditions, some of these effects have already been indirectly incorporated in the models due to some of the loan-level variables used (e.g. DLTV in the mortgage dataset).  Therefore, the key objective of this study is to investigate whether the inclusion of macroeconomic variables (see later in Section 4.1) is able to improve LGD prediction any further, or, particularly for the mortgage model, whether the macroeconomic effects are already adequately reflected in variables that are updated with the help of our housing market indicator.  


Figure 2: Mean LGD for personal loans data

4. Methodology
4.1. Macroeconomic variables
The UK experienced a major economic recession in the early 1990s, which can be seen in a large drop in net lending in publicly available data (shown in Figure 3).  However, since then most aspects of the UK economy had experienced a steady and significant growth.  The datasets available here record defaults that happened between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, so they encompass these years.  

The macroeconomic variables considered in this study are listed in Table 1.  Lucas (2003) suggested the use of a few macroeconomic variables, viz. change in interest rates, unemployment rates, asset prices and wage inflation, in a stress testing context, and this selection was expanded upon.  All variables were sourced from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), and supplemented where necessary with data from the Bank of England (BoE), and Halifax.  With the exception of the variables related to the Halifax Housing Price Index, the rest of the selected variables have data available from the year 1976 through to 2007, which also explains the selection of BOE interest rates over the more directly relevant mortgage interest rates (which are only available from 1993).  We select variables that are seasonally adjusted unless they are unavailable or not consistent with information from the source.  


Figure 3: Total consumer credit: UK net lending, in sterling millions, seasonally adjusted, for years 1986 to 2009, source from ONS and BOE.

It is inevitable that most of the macroeconomic variables are correlated with each other.  However, removing the inappropriate variable at an early stage would mean the potential exclusion of valuable information.  Hence, we apply a form of stepwise selection, as explained in the following sub-section.  



Table 1: Macroeconomic variables considered in the analysis; variables taken at two time points (where available), at start and default.  
Macroeconomic Variable	Source	Time Unit	Definition	Motivation
Net Lending Growth (VRZZ)	ONS	Quarterly	Total consumer credit, net lending, seasonally adjusted, year on year quarterly change	This is an indication of how easy it is for consumers to get extra funds, and might give an indication of how difficult it is to secure a loan.  Generally expect an increase (at default time) to lead to a drop in LGD.
Disposable Income Growth (IHXZ)	ONS	Quarterly	Real households’ disposable income per head, seasonally adjusted, (constant 2003 prices), year on year quarterly change	This gives an indication of post-tax income, which might be a more accurate indicator of wealth than income itself.  Generally expect an increase to lead to a drop in LGD.
GDP Growth (IHYP)	ONS	Quarterly	Gross Domestic Product, not seasonally adjusted, (constant 2003 prices), year on year quarterly change	A common indicator of overall economic growth.  Generally expect an increase to lead to a drop in LGD.
Purchasing Power Growth (SEZH)	ONS	Annually	Internal purchasing power of the pound (based on Retail Prices Index), not seasonally adjusted, (constant 2003 prices)	This gives an indication of wealth and inflation.  Generally expect an increase to lead to a drop in LGD.
Net lending Growth on Dwellings (AAJT)	ONS	Quarterly	Banks net lending secured on dwellings, not seasonally adjusted, year on year quarterly change	This is an indication of how easy it is for consumers to secure a mortgage loan.  Generally expect an increase to lead to a drop in LGD.
Unemployment Rate (MGSX)	ONS	Monthly	Unemployment rate, UK, All aged 16 and over, percentage, seasonally adjusted	An economic indicator for the job market.  Generally expect an increase to lead to an increase in LGD as well.
Saving Ratio (NRJS)	ONS	Quarterly	Household saving ratio, seasonally adjusted	A reflection of level of saving to level of disposable household resources.  Generally expect an increase to lead to a drop in LGD.
Interest Rate (UDBEDR)	BOE	Monthly	Bank of England interest rate, mean over the month	A pseudo-indicator of cost of a mortgage loan.  Generally expect an increase to lead to an increase in LGD.
House Price Index Growth (for mortgage loan dataset) 	Halifax	Quarterly	All houses, all buyers, non seasonally adjusted, regional, year on year quarterly change	An economic indicator on the housing market.  Generally expect an increase to lead to a drop in LGD.
House Price Index Growth (for personal loan dataset) 	Halifax	Monthly	All houses, all buyers, non seasonally adjusted, year on year monthly change	An economic indicator on the housing market.  Generally expect an increase to lead to a drop in LGD.



For several of the macroeconomic variables, it is difficult to make any prior expectation of how they would specifically affect mortgage or personal loan LGD, but we try to motivate the selection of each variable in Table 1.  Note that, apart from measuring these indicators at or around default time, we also allowed for a second data series in which the same indicators were taken at loan origination (where available) so as to investigate potential cohort effects (see next section). As part of our earlier investigation, to account for the possibility of a cohort effect, we initially tried including a dummy variable for each year of origination and default in the models, but they did not produce any significant effects, so this was not further detailed in the paper.

4.2. Modelling methodology
We refer to the LGD models already developed on each dataset as the base models.  Because of the correlations amongst the macroeconomic variables themselves, we decide not to include more than one macroeconomic variable in each of our base models (Campbell and Dietrich (1983) incorporate only local unemployment rates in the development of their mortgage loan default model; Hui et al. (2006) incorporates only the monthly private domestic price index in Hong Kong in their measurement for provision for risk under Basel II regulations).  Due to how the default date was recorded in the mortgage loan dataset, we chose to focus only on two time intervals per loan, i.e. the year the loan started and the year it went into default.  Each observation will have a set of macroeconomic variables corresponding to that of its origination year, which would give an indication of the economic climate at the time the loan was approved, as well as act as some differentiating factor between lending practices at various points of the economic cycle as suggested in Breeden et al. (2008).  Secondly, the time of default would give an indication of the “current” state of economy, i.e. state of the economy at the time of default.  In the case of the personal loans dataset, only default date information is readily known, so the only time point of interest here would be default time (instead of both start and default time points of the loan).  Hence, here we use the set of macroeconomic variables corresponding to time of default of each loan.  
In order to assess the relevance and significance of each macroeconomic variable for each LGD model, we include the macroeconomic variables one at a time​[3]​ into a series of extended models.  From each such resulting model, we apply the model onto the test set, consisting of accounts that were not used in the development of any model.  We extract the following pieces of information:
	Any variable in the extended or base model that becomes insignificant (has p-value greater than 0.01, excluding categorical variables), which might also be the macroeconomic variable itself; if so, the macroeconomic variable will not be considered any further.
	Any variable in the extended or base model with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) greater than 10 (only applicable to OLS models, i.e. the mortgage loans haircut model and personal loans LGD model); if there are any, the macroeconomic variable will not be considered any further.  For details on the values of high VIF, see Fernandez (2007).
	The performance statistics of the model for both test and training sets (Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) for the mortgage loan probability of repossession model and R-square for the mortgage loans haircut model and personal loans LGD model).  These performance measures are chosen because they are the main ones used in regression modelling.
The inclusion of time lags and leads to the macroeconomic variables were investigated for both LGD models, but did not give any significant improvement.  Also, time leads, especially if they are more than 6 months, are less desirable because the goal here is prediction.  



5. Mortgage loan LGD results
5.1. Probability of Repossession Model
The resulting test-set ROC values (only if variables remain significant at the 99% level of confidence) are detailed in Table 2.  Most of the macroeconomic variables taken from the start of the loan turn out to be insignificant and the variable that gives the best improvement in ROC (in the training set) is the interest rate at default, which is found to increase ROC from 0.7576 to 0.7684.  

Table 2: Performance of Probability of Repossession Model (test sets) with macroeconomic variables.  
PROBABILITY OF REPOSSESSION MODEL
Model	Additional Variable	Estimate Sign	ROC (Test)
Base (DLTV)			0.7595
PROBABILITY OF REPOSSESSION MODEL; Macroeconomic variables at origination
Model	Additional Variable	Model Estimate	ROC (Test)
Base + MV 1	Net Lending Growth at origination	-	insignificant
Base + MV 2	Disposable Income Growth at origination	+	insignificant
Base + MV 3	GDP Growth at origination	+	insignificant
Base + MV 4	Purchasing Power Growth at origination	-	insignificant
Base + MV 5	Unemployment Rate at origination	-	0.7594
Base + MV 6	Saving Ratio at origination	+	0.7595
Base + MV 7	Interest Rate at origination	+	insignificant
Base + MV 8	Net Lending Growth for Dwellings at origination	-	insignificant
Base + MV 9	House Price Index Growth at origination	-	0.7598
PROBABILITY OF REPOSSESSION MODEL; Macroeconomic variables at default
Model	Additional Variable	Estimate Sign	ROC (Test)
Base + MV 10	Net Lending Growth at default	-	0.7597
Base + MV 11	Disposable Income Growth at default	-	Base variable insig.
Base + MV 12	GDP Growth at default	+	0.7685
Base + MV 13	Purchasing Power Growth at default	-	Base variable insig.
Base + MV 14	Unemployment Rate at default	-	Base variable insig.
Base + MV 15	Saving Ratio at default	-	0.7681
Base + MV 16	Interest Rate at default	+	0.7696
Base + MV 17	Net Lending Growth for Dwellings at default	-	0.7631
Base + MV 18	House Price Index Growth at default	+	insignificant

Interest rate at default is found to be positively related to probability of repossession.  This is probably because an increase in interest rate would imply that borrowing has become more expensive (for the borrower), leading to increased repossession.  However, we see that the macroeconomic variables on the whole only result in a modest improvement in the ROC value, perhaps because HPI (which is the main macroeconomic indicator in the housing industry) is already embedded in the calculation of DLTV. 

5.2. Haircut Model
The resulting models’ R-square values (only if variables remain significant at the 99% level of confidence) are as summarised in Table 3.  Although more macroeconomic variables taken at the start of the loan turn out to be significant, they do not substantially improve the R-square.  Again, interest rate at time of default contributes most to the haircut model, increasing R-square from 0.143 to 0.170.  An increase in the interest rate at default implies that potential buyers may find it harder to find an affordable loan; hence, the reduced demand may force banks to release repossessed properties at a less favourable price.





Table 3: Performance of Haircut Model (test sets) with macroeconomic variables 
HAIRCUT MODEL
Model	Additional Variable	Estimate Sign	 (Test)
Base (LTV)			0.1428
HAIRCUT MODEL; Macroeconomic variables at origination
Model	Additional Variable	Estimate Sign	 (Test)
Base + MV 1	Net Lending Growth at origination	-	0.1431
Base + MV 2	Disposable Income Growth at origination	-	insignificant
Base + MV 3	GDP Growth at origination	-	0.1455
Base + MV 4	Purchasing Power Growth at origination	+	0.1462
Base + MV 5	Unemployment Rate at origination	-	0.1467
Base + MV 6	Saving Ratio at origination	+	insignificant
Base + MV 7	Interest Rate at origination	-	0.1490
Base + MV 8	Net Lending Growth for Dwellings at origination	-	0.1445
Base + MV 9	House Price Index Growth at origination	+	0.1448
HAIRCUT MODEL; Macroeconomic variables at default
Model	Additional Variable	Estimate Sign	 (Test)
Base + MV 10	Net Lending Growth at default	+	insignificant
Base + MV 11	Disposable Income Growth at default	+	0.1435
Base + MV 12	GDP Growth at default	-	0.1495
Base + MV 13	Purchasing Power Growth at default	+	0.1672
Base + MV 14	Unemployment Rate at default	+	0.1432
Base + MV 15	Saving Ratio at default	+	0.1438
Base + MV 16	Interest Rate at default	-	0.1702
Base + MV 17	Net Lending Growth for Dwellings at default	-	0.1478
Base + MV 18	House Price Index Growth at default	+	0.1481



5.3. Two-stage LGD model
From the above two sub-sections, it was found that interest rates at default gave the best improvements to the component models.  This variable was then included into the Probability of Repossession Model and the Haircut Model.  Together with the standard deviation obtained from the Haircut Standard Deviation Model, estimates for LGD were produced according to the methodology described in Leow and Mues (2012).  Table 4 displays the performance statistics for the test sets of the two LGD models developed (the original (base) LGD model previously developed, and the macroeconomic LGD model developed here).  Within each component model, we see an improvement in performance measures, and this eventually translates to a clear improvement in R-square value for the overall LGD model.

Table 4: Performance statistics of mortgage loan LGD models (Test Sets)
Method, Dataset		MSE	MAE
Two-stage base model, Test	0.2848	0.0244	0.1054
Two-stage macroeconomic model, Test	0.3129	0.0234	0.1018

We highlight two observations.  First, this improvement is noteworthy because, as it was noted earlier, the HPI was already embedded into both the component models.  On top of this, the HPI is also used in the calculation of LGD, because the indexed valuation (given in Equation 2) is involved in the calculation for expected shortfall (if default occurs).  Second, probably because HPI was already involved in the LGD base model, the variable HPI growth (HPIG), which is the main macroeconomic indicator of the housing market, itself only gave small improvements or appeared insignificant.  


Figure 4: Mean observed and predicted mortgage loan LGD over each default quarter for base and macroeconomic LGD models (test sets).  The crosses represent mean observed LGD (aggregated over all test set observations that defaulted in the corresponding quarter), the solid dots represent mean predicted LGD from the base model and the squares represent mean predicted LGD from the macroeconomic LGD model.

In order to check calibration performance of the model over time, the performance of the two two-stage LGD models (i.e. without and with the added macroeconomic variable) are plotted on a single graph (see Figure 4).  From there, we see that both give decent aggregate predictions but are unable to fully reflect the highs and lows that the observed LGD goes through in each year.  Also, we see that the two models give better predictions for different time periods, which is more obvious in Figure 5.  During the economic downturn the UK experienced in the early 1990s, the base LGD model (represented by the solid dots) was underestimating LGD, whilst the macroeconomic LGD model (represented by the squares) was able to give a closer prediction.  However, during the rest of the period observed (1993 onwards), the macroeconomic LGD model consistently gives a lower prediction than the base LGD model, i.e. underestimating LGD more frequently and by a further distance than the base LGD model.  So, although the inclusion of macroeconomic variables improved model predictions during the period of downturn, it caused the model to somewhat underestimate predictions of LGD during periods outside of the downturn.  


Figure 5: Average predicted minus average observed mortgage loan LGD per default quarter, for base and macroeconomic LGD models (test sets).  The solid dots represent mean difference (residual) for the base model and the squares represent mean difference for the macroeconomic LGD model.



Figure 6: Scatterplot of predicted and actual LGD in LGD bands for base and macroeconomic models (test sets).  The solid diagonal line represents perfect prediction, the solid dots represent predictions from the base LGD model and the squares represent predictions from the macroeconomic LGD model.  

To further verify to what extent these various models are able to produce unbiased estimates at an LGD loan pool level, we create a graphical representation of the results (from the test sets).  We look at a binned scatterplot of predicted LGD value bands against actual LGD values, where predicted LGD values are put into ascending order and binned into equal-frequency value bands.  For each method used in the calculation of LGD, the mean actual LGD value is plotted against the mean predicted LGD value (for that LGD band) onto a single graph, included in Figure 6.  Although the base and macroeconomic models give very similar performances, the pool-level R-square value of 0.994 achieved by the macroeconomic model (against that of 0.990 achieved by the base model) differentiates the models.  Towards the larger values of LGD (see e.g. middle part of the graph), we see that the macroeconomic model was able to give a closer mean predicted value than the base model.  This is in line with our earlier observation that larger LGD values are associated with loans that go into default during downturn periods, and that the macroeconomic model was able to better predict for these accounts.  However, in the lower LGD bands (cf. lower-left section), this advantage no longer holds.

In summary, although the macroeconomic model was able to produce a higher R-square value, it did not seem to be able to consistently improve prediction performance in terms of distribution of LGD and mean predictions.  This could suggest that macroeconomic variables could be non-linearly related to recovery rates, so for example, a drop in interest rates from 5% to 4% would affect recovery rates differently than if interest rates went from 1.5% to 0.5%.  Also, the effect could be different for different segments of mortgage loans, so the inclusion of interaction terms could be considered in future work.  Bruche and González-Aguado (2010) suggest that default rates would be a good predictor of recovery rates, however, the internal bank default rate was unavailable, and although a general UK default rate was considered, this data is only available starting from 1993.  We believe that it is likely the economy could have a more obvious impact on likelihood of default; for example, Campbell and Dietrich (1983) showed a statistically significant relationship between default and the economic situation, in particular local unemployment rates.  However, it can be difficult to show a direct relationship between macroeconomic variables and recovery rates. 

6. Unsecured personal loan LGD model results
Table 5 displays the (loan-level) R-square values of the personal loans LGD base model, as well as R-square values of the extended models with each macroeconomic variable included, as measured at time of default.  Considering that this dataset consists of defaulted unsecured personal loans, we expect LGD to be more likely affected by general indicators of the economy than by industry-specific macroeconomic indicators like the House Price Index.  Perhaps surprisingly though, the only macroeconomic variable that is found to be statistically significant is net lending growth at default.  A potential explanation for the observed negative relationship could be that, when there is an increase in net lending at the time of default, the debtor might be more successful in securing funds from other sources to try and repay his loan, hence a lower LGD.  

Table 5: Results of personal loans LGD base and macroeconomic models (test sets)
Model	Additional Variable	Model Estimate	 (Test)
Base 	 		0.1428
Model	Additional Variable	Model Estimate	 (Test)
Base + MV 1	Net Lending Growth at default	-	0.0733
Base + MV 2	Disposable Income Growth at default	-	insignificant
Base + MV 3	GDP Growth at default	-	insignificant
Base + MV 4	Purchasing Power Growth at default	-	insignificant
Base + MV 5	Unemployment Rate at default	-	insignificant
Base + MV 6	Saving Ratio at default	+	insignificant
Base + MV 7	Interest Rate at default	+	insignificant
Base + MV 8	Net Lending Growth for Dwellings at default	+	insignificant
Base + MV 9	House Price Index Growth at default	+	insignificant


Figure 7: Mean observed and predicted personal loan LGD over each quarter of default for base and macroeconomic models (test sets).  The crosses represent the mean observed LGD, the circles represent predictions from the base LGD model and the squares represent predictions from the macroeconomic LGD model.

However, we note that, despite this variable being significant, there is no improvement in R-square value.  We also observe in the dataset that the mean LGD is quite flat across the default years (cf. Figure 7), and that the mean LGD observed during the downturn years was not that different to non-downturn years.  The predictions from the two LGD models are also very similar, showing only a larger difference in the first quarter of 1994.  It is possible that loans that went into default during downturn years have a longer recovery process but finally achieve similar LGD values to default loans from non-downturn years.  However, in this dataset, we only have information on LGD but not about how long each recovery process took.  Figure 8 reinforces the observation that the predictions coming from the LGD macroeconomic model are very similar to those from the LGD base model.  


Figure 8: Mean difference between observed and predicted personal loan LGD, for base and macroeconomic LGD models (test sets).  The circles represent mean difference from the base LGD model and the squares represent mean difference from the macroeconomic LGD model.  

In summary, although there were some benefits to incorporating interest rate as an additional variable in our mortgage LGD model(s), no such improvement was found for the model built on the personal loans dataset.  



7. Concluding remarks and areas for further research
In this paper, we investigated the inclusion of macroeconomic variables on two different retail loan LGD models, one on residential mortgage loans and the other on unsecured personal loans.  Although macroeconomic variables have gained significance in corporate LGD models, they do not seem to have the same level of importance in retail LGD models.

In the case of residential mortgage loan LGD, both the Probability of Repossession Model and the Haircut Model benefit from the inclusion of macroeconomic variables (more specifically, interest rates at default).  This is an interesting contribution because it should be noted that the HPI, which is the leading macroeconomic variable in the housing market, is already embedded in the Probability of Repossession Model, the Haircut Model and the calculation of mortgage loan LGD.  Combining the component models, we find that the overall loan-level R-square for the LGD model increases; similarly, pool-level R-square also slightly increases by adding interest rate.  Mean predicted values of LGD for each quarter are also close, implying good calibration performance over time.  However, the model with the added macro-economic variables seemed to be able to predict better for higher LGD bands.  This implies that LGD predictions from the macroeconomic model are ‘skewed’ towards the downturn period: the model performs better on observations that went into default during the economic downturn, but was more frequently underestimating LGD for non-downturn periods.  More work is required here, perhaps to investigate if macroeconomic variables are non-linearly related to recovery rates for mortgage defaults, or if they affect different loans (e.g. loans of different DLTV bands or security type) differently.  

Secondly, where unsecured personal loan LGD is concerned, all of the macroeconomic variables turn out statistically insignificant, the exception being net lending growth (at default), where an increase in net lending at the time of default helps the debtor be more successful in securing funds from other sources to repay his loan, leading to a lower LGD.  

However, the inclusion of this variable brings no discernable improvement in prediction of LGD, which seems to suggest that personal loan LGD seems to be less affected by the economy after accounting for loan-level characteristics.  This result is similar to that of Bruche and González-Aguado (2010) and Bellotti and Crook (2009), who find that the impact that macroeconomic variables have on recovery rates are limited.  We suspect that a lot of the variation in LGD on this dataset is either due to noise or the result of changes in internal collection policies, but insufficient data is available to further explore this suggestion.  

Through this work, we illustrate the kind of improvements macroeconomic variables could bring to LGD models, and how we can expect them to be quite different for secured and non-secured portfolios – we see different macroeconomic indicators contributing to the different LGD models with varying effectiveness.  We also suggest that financial institutions may attempt a similar exercise for different portfolios and the choice of variable then could depend on the performance criteria looked at in our paper as well as on other considerations.  In terms of economic downturn LGD estimation, we suggest a few ways of how our models could be useful: incorporating a house price fall and stressed economic covariate value as model inputs and taking the LGD that comes out as a downturn estimate; or using the model to pool loans into different LGD risk bands and then extracting the economic downturn LGD for each band from those values observed during periods of higher default rates.  

Ultimately, one could argue that although there was a performance improvement for the mortgage models, neither of the retail loan LGD models investigated here benefited from further incorporating the effects of the economy quite to the extent that was perhaps expected.  In further research, we explore whether macroeconomic variables would be able to contribute more substantially to credit risk retail models in other ways, for example, in survival analysis models, where they are able to accommodate time-dependent variables, as well as the estimation of time to repossession, which can be modelled statistically.  The next major recession happened in 2008, and although macroeconomic variables for this period are available and would be very interesting to include in our analysis, we unfortunately are unable to gain access to the corresponding bank data; hence we also suggest the possibility of a future follow-up study.
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^1	  Note that, partially due to data limitations, we are using nominal loss here as opposed to discounted loss.  
^2	  Repossession rate here is defined as the proportion of loans defaulting in the corresponding time period that would end up being repossessed.
^3	  It is possible to include more than one macroeconomic variable and possibly get better predictions, in which case we could consider principal components to remove some correlation.  However, this would introduce other minor complications, e.g. in applying the model for prediction purposes, one would now need to collect data about multiple indicators and apply a calculation to produce a factor score; also ease of interpretation of the factors may be a concern.
